Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a powerful technique to reveal the secrets using detectable physical leakages from logic elements, which brings severe security threats to modern circuits. To alleviate this problem, applying cell-level countermeasure is usually a suitable solution, which is mainly implemented as dual-rail precharge logic. Mace et al. has the proposed dynamic current mode logic (DyCML) scheme as a novel technology to resist SCA, whose power consumption is constant regardless of the data processed. However, the DyCML-based sequential elements are still in blank field. So, we have implemented a novel flip-flop compatible with DyCML, whose enhanced security has been proved by corresponding simulations.
DyCML scheme: The DyCML scheme can be treated as a novel method to resist SCA, which utilises a dynamic current source with a fictitious ground [6] . Owing to the dynamic and differential structure, the power consumptions of cell-level DyCML-based circuits are independent of the data processed, leading to the same level SCA resistance as other DRP circuits. Furthermore, active loads are used in DyCML instead of the traditional loading resistors in the conventional static current-source mode logic to decrease power consumption.
As shown in Fig. 1 , the generic structure of a DyCML-based cell is made up of four blocks: the precharge block (P1, P2), a latch for holding logic values after evaluation stage (P3, P4), dynamic current source (N 1, C1) and the function block to sample the input values during the evaluation stage. When the input clock is low, the cell is at precharge phase, during which transistors P1, P2 and N 2 are turned on, pulling up the internal nodes (TA, TB) to VDD and pulling down the internal node TX to GND. When the input clock is high, the cell is at evaluation phase, during which transistors N 1 is turned on, providing a conducting path from the two output nodes to the capacitor C1.
On the basis of the operating principles of DyCML cells, we can easily find that there are constantly one precharge phase and one evaluation phase in every clock cycle. During the precharge phase, all internal nodes are keeping high level, whereas during the evaluation phase, only one node is pulled down to low level according to the inputs. As a result, the DyCML structure is SCA resistant, which has constant power consumption and is independent of the processed data under the condition of balanced capacitive loads. The operational principle of the proposed DyCML-FF is explained as follows. At the falling edge of CLKA, stage 2 first enters the precharge phase and outputs 0 at nodes Q andQ. After an inverter delay, stage 1 enters the evaluation phase and samples the input complementary values. At the subsequent rising edge of the input clock (CLKA), stage 2 first enters the evaluation phase, which samples the complementary values provided by stage 1. Then, stage 1 clocked by CLKB enters the precharge phase by an inverter delay with respect to CLKA, whose output terminals are precharged to 0. In short, the DyCML-FF samples the complementary input values at the falling edge of the clock and outputs the complementary values at the subsequent rising edge of the clock. Note that stage 1 is clocked by the delayed clock signal, so negative setup time can be provided in our proposed design, i.e. the time of the input signal transitions can be lagging behind the clock signal, which greatly improves the delay performance of the device.
As described above, considering both internal and output nodes together (QC, QD, Q&Q) in complementary rails, at every rising or falling clock edge there are constantly one 0 1 flip, one 1 0 flip and two 0 0 transitions. This fact leads to constant total power consumption, which builds the basis for its SCA resistance. As a result, we think that the proposed DyCML-FF is compatible for most cell-level-based implementations of secure applications against SCA.
Experiment results: To evaluate the functionality and efficiency of the proposed design against SCA, the power metric of DyCML-FF has been simulated and compared with the SABL-and WDDL-based FF designs. The testbench follows that in [7] . 
To evaluate the resistance of the proposed design against PA attacks, two parameters normalised energy deviation (NED) and normalised standard deviation (NSD) are considered [8] . The parameter NED is defined as the percentage difference between the maximum energy consumption (E max ) and minimum energy consumption (E min ) over all possible input combinations and transitions as shown in (1). The parameter NSD indicates how much the energy consumption varies based on the inputs as shown in (2) . Ideally these two parameters should approximate zero for better resistance to PA attacks [3] 
where
Except for NED and NSD, we have also applied several other essential measurement criteria to compare the performance of DyCML-FF with other FF implementations, e.g. minimum D − Q delay (t D−Q ), power consumption, power-delay-product (PDP) etc. On the basis of these parameters, the corresponding simulation results are shown in Table 1 . The simulation results prove that DyCML-FF functions properly and at every rising or falling clock edge, there are, respectively, two variant and invariant data transitions, which is broadly in conformity to the theory in the above section. As is obvious from Table 1 , the DyCML-FF has achieved great improvement in both NED and NSD when compared with standard-cell (SC)-FF, and is more efficient than SABL-FF and WDDL-FF, proving that the proposed FF is more resistant to SCA. In terms of delay performance, DyCML-FF takes the minimum t D−Q delay among various designs, except for SC-FF due to its negative setup time feature, whereas SABL-FF has positive setup time and the WDDL-FF takes more than one clock cycle due to its wave logic. In terms of power performance, the DyCML-FF consumes about the same level power as SABL-FF, whereas the WDDL-FF consumes the largest power. This is mainly attributed to the total four standard-cell FFs applied in WDDL-FF. Furthermore, the dynamic current-source logic applied in the simplified latch of DyCML-FF contributes to its low-power efficiency. Accordingly, the PDP performance of the DyCML-FF ranks the best mainly due to its low-power characteristic and relatively good speed performance, which is 11.20 and 88.31% less than SABL-FF and WDDL-FF, respectively. Consequently, the new design conforms with the design rules for DRP-FFs, which can absolutely provide high SCA resistance for hardware implementations of security algorithms.
To further evaluate how the proposed scheme mitigates PA attacks in real scenarios, experiments are carried out on a complete implementation of AES-SBox module. The correlation power attack (CPA) attack results show that with about 20 power traces SC-based module can be successfully attacked, whereas DyCML scheme and other cell-level countermeasure logic can perfectly protect the AES-SBox module. Specially, the attack result of DyCML-based circuit is demonstrated in Fig. 3 . Consequently, due to the fact that DyCML-FF not only offers excellent SCA resistance, but also exhibits high-level PDP performance when compared with SABL-FF and WDDL-FF for its low-power consumption and relatively high speed, we prefer this DyCML-based implementation to be a good choice for sequential elements in cryptographic application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) instead of SABL-and WDDL-based FF implementations.
Conclusions:
In this Letter, we have proposed a novel full-custom FF design based on DyCML scheme, which consumes constant power regardless of all possible input data combinations. The detailed celllevel experimental results show that the proposed design gains an improvement in terms of NED and NSD, which proves the moderate level of side-channel resistance against its counterparts. Meanwhile, the DyCML-FF has made a reduction by 10.60 and 88.35% in terms of PDP when compared with SABL-FF and WDDL-FF, respectively. In addition, the case study of AES substitution has further proved the SCA resistance of the proposed scheme. As a consequence, the proposed DyCML-FF is an appropriate choice for sequential elements in ASIC, where both security and PDP are highly required.
